---
order: 3
summary: Exact primitives, key lifetimes, and a precise account of what the edge can
  and cannot see.
title: Cryptography
path: concepts/cryptography
status: published
---

# Cryptography

This page is the honest version of "military grade". It lists what Proxility
uses, how long keys live, and what each component can see.

## Primitives

| Layer | Primitive |
|---|---|
| Participant identity | Ed25519 |
| Certificate issuance | Proxility CA, Ed25519, 24-hour leaf validity |
| Session handshake | Noise `IK` |
| Key agreement | X25519 **and** ML-KEM-768, hybrid — both must succeed |
| Bulk encryption | ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD) |
| Transcript hashing | SHA-512 |
| Connector ↔ edge channel | TLS 1.3, mutually authenticated, as an outer wrapper |

The key agreement is hybrid on purpose. X25519 alone is sound against today's
adversaries but not against one who records traffic now and decrypts it after a
quantum computer arrives. ML-KEM-768 covers that case; combining both means a
break in either one alone does not expose the session.

## Key lifetimes

| Key | Lifetime |
|---|---|
| Identity private key | Life of the host. Generated locally, never transmitted |
| Identity certificate | 24 hours, renewed at 8 hours remaining |
| Session keys | Rekeyed every 15 minutes or 4 GiB, whichever comes first |
| Enrolment token | 60 minutes, single use |

Sessions are forward secret: recovering a host's identity key later does not
decrypt traffic captured earlier, because session keys come from ephemeral
agreement and are discarded on rekey.

## What each component can see

This is the part worth being exact about.

| Component | Sees |
|---|---|
| Origin connector | Plaintext, because it is one endpoint |
| Destination connector | Plaintext, because it is the other endpoint |
| Proxility edge | Ciphertext, plus metadata: the two identities, the service name, byte counts, timestamps |
| ScaiLabs operators | What the edge sees. Not session contents |

The edge **cannot** decrypt a session. It holds no session keys; the keys are
agreed directly between the two connectors inside the relayed stream. What the
edge does hold is metadata, and metadata is not nothing — who talked to what,
when, and how much is visible to the edge and appears in the decision log. If
your threat model excludes ScaiLabs from seeing that metadata, Proxility in its
hosted form is not the right deployment; ask about a dedicated edge.

Your own application-layer TLS passes through untouched. Proxility does not
terminate, inspect or re-sign it, so end-to-end TLS to your service remains
end-to-end.

## Implementation

The data plane uses established implementations rather than bespoke
cryptography. Primitive choices follow current public guidance on
post-quantum migration — hybrid key agreement now, rather than a flag day
later.

## What has not happened yet

Stated plainly, because a security product that is vague here does not deserve
trust:

| Item | State |
|---|---|
| Independent cryptographic audit | Not yet commissioned |
| FIPS 140-3 validated build | Not available |
| Common Criteria evaluation | Not started |
| Published threat model | Pending |

Do not represent Proxility as certified or accredited while this table says
otherwise. Update it the moment any line changes — and update the marketing
copy at the same time.
