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Cryptography

This page is the honest version of "military grade". It lists what Proxility uses, how long keys live, and what each component can see.

Primitives#

Layer Primitive
Participant identity Ed25519
Certificate issuance Proxility CA, Ed25519, 24-hour leaf validity
Session handshake Noise IK
Key agreement X25519 and ML-KEM-768, hybrid — both must succeed
Bulk encryption ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD)
Transcript hashing SHA-512
Connector ↔ edge channel TLS 1.3, mutually authenticated, as an outer wrapper

The key agreement is hybrid on purpose. X25519 alone is sound against today's adversaries but not against one who records traffic now and decrypts it after a quantum computer arrives. ML-KEM-768 covers that case; combining both means a break in either one alone does not expose the session.

Key lifetimes#

Key Lifetime
Identity private key Life of the host. Generated locally, never transmitted
Identity certificate 24 hours, renewed at 8 hours remaining
Session keys Rekeyed every 15 minutes or 4 GiB, whichever comes first
Enrolment token 60 minutes, single use

Sessions are forward secret: recovering a host's identity key later does not decrypt traffic captured earlier, because session keys come from ephemeral agreement and are discarded on rekey.

What each component can see#

This is the part worth being exact about.

Component Sees
Origin connector Plaintext, because it is one endpoint
Destination connector Plaintext, because it is the other endpoint
Proxility edge Ciphertext, plus metadata: the two identities, the service name, byte counts, timestamps
ScaiLabs operators What the edge sees. Not session contents

The edge cannot decrypt a session. It holds no session keys; the keys are agreed directly between the two connectors inside the relayed stream. What the edge does hold is metadata, and metadata is not nothing — who talked to what, when, and how much is visible to the edge and appears in the decision log. If your threat model excludes ScaiLabs from seeing that metadata, Proxility in its hosted form is not the right deployment; ask about a dedicated edge.

Your own application-layer TLS passes through untouched. Proxility does not terminate, inspect or re-sign it, so end-to-end TLS to your service remains end-to-end.

Implementation#

The data plane uses established implementations rather than bespoke cryptography. Primitive choices follow current public guidance on post-quantum migration — hybrid key agreement now, rather than a flag day later.

What has not happened yet#

Stated plainly, because a security product that is vague here does not deserve trust:

Item State
Independent cryptographic audit Not yet commissioned
FIPS 140-3 validated build Not available
Common Criteria evaluation Not started
Published threat model Pending

Do not represent Proxility as certified or accredited while this table says otherwise. Update it the moment any line changes — and update the marketing copy at the same time.

Updated 2026-11-08 18:08:05 View source (.md) rev 2