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Identity

Every participant in a Proxility fabric — connector, workload, human — has an identity it can prove cryptographically. Policy is written about these identities, so understanding them is the prerequisite for everything else.

The identity string#

text
1
prox://<tenant>/<realm>/<name>

For example prox://acme/prod/payments. The tenant and realm come from your organisation's structure (see Tenants and realms); the name is yours to choose and must be unique inside the realm.

The identity appears as a URI SAN in the participant's certificate. It is the only thing policy matches on. IP addresses never appear in a rule.

Enrolment#

A participant's private key is generated on the participant, during enrolment, and never transmitted. What travels is a one-time enrolment token:

  1. An operator with connector:create in the realm issues a token. It is single-use and expires in 60 minutes by default.
  2. The connector generates an Ed25519 keypair locally.
  3. It presents the token plus a certificate request to the enrolment endpoint.
  4. The Proxility CA issues a certificate binding the public key to the identity. The token is burned.

A leaked token is a real problem for its 60-minute window — it lets an attacker enrol a connector under that name. It is not a key, so it cannot decrypt anything, and burning it on first use means a race is detectable: the legitimate enrolment fails loudly. Keep tokens in ScaiVault rather than in a shell history or a ticket.

Certificate lifetime#

Property Value
Algorithm Ed25519
Lifetime 24 hours
Renewal Automatic, attempted at 8 hours remaining
Revocation Immediate — the edge refuses the identity on next handshake

Short lifetimes are the point. A compromised host stops being useful to an attacker within a day without anyone running a revocation process, and revocation when you do run it takes effect at the next handshake rather than waiting for a CRL to propagate.

Workload identity#

A connector can issue identities to workloads behind it, so policy can be written about a specific service rather than about the whole network the connector fronts. Two mechanisms:

  • Attested — the connector verifies the workload against the local platform (systemd unit, Kubernetes service account, cloud instance identity document) and requests a derived certificate for it.
  • Delegated — the connector treats a local address and port as a named workload. Weaker: anything that can reach that address locally inherits the identity. Use attested identity where the platform supports it.

Human identity#

Console and CLI authentication is delegated to ScaiKey. A human session yields a short-lived identity of the form prox://acme/prod/user:alice, which policy can name directly — useful for giving one person access to one internal application without a VPN client.

What identity does not do#

Identity answers who is this. It says nothing about may they. That is Policy, evaluated separately on every single connection.

Updated 2026-11-08 18:08:05 View source (.md) rev 2