Identity
Every participant in a Proxility fabric — connector, workload, human — has an identity it can prove cryptographically. Policy is written about these identities, so understanding them is the prerequisite for everything else.
The identity string#
1 | |
For example prox://acme/prod/payments. The tenant and realm come from your
organisation's structure (see
Tenants and realms); the name is yours to
choose and must be unique inside the realm.
The identity appears as a URI SAN in the participant's certificate. It is the only thing policy matches on. IP addresses never appear in a rule.
Enrolment#
A participant's private key is generated on the participant, during enrolment, and never transmitted. What travels is a one-time enrolment token:
- An operator with
connector:createin the realm issues a token. It is single-use and expires in 60 minutes by default. - The connector generates an Ed25519 keypair locally.
- It presents the token plus a certificate request to the enrolment endpoint.
- The Proxility CA issues a certificate binding the public key to the identity. The token is burned.
A leaked token is a real problem for its 60-minute window — it lets an attacker enrol a connector under that name. It is not a key, so it cannot decrypt anything, and burning it on first use means a race is detectable: the legitimate enrolment fails loudly. Keep tokens in ScaiVault rather than in a shell history or a ticket.
Certificate lifetime#
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Algorithm | Ed25519 |
| Lifetime | 24 hours |
| Renewal | Automatic, attempted at 8 hours remaining |
| Revocation | Immediate — the edge refuses the identity on next handshake |
Short lifetimes are the point. A compromised host stops being useful to an attacker within a day without anyone running a revocation process, and revocation when you do run it takes effect at the next handshake rather than waiting for a CRL to propagate.
Workload identity#
A connector can issue identities to workloads behind it, so policy can be written about a specific service rather than about the whole network the connector fronts. Two mechanisms:
- Attested — the connector verifies the workload against the local platform (systemd unit, Kubernetes service account, cloud instance identity document) and requests a derived certificate for it.
- Delegated — the connector treats a local address and port as a named workload. Weaker: anything that can reach that address locally inherits the identity. Use attested identity where the platform supports it.
Human identity#
Console and CLI authentication is delegated to ScaiKey. A human session
yields a short-lived identity of the form prox://acme/prod/user:alice, which
policy can name directly — useful for giving one person access to one internal
application without a VPN client.
What identity does not do#
Identity answers who is this. It says nothing about may they. That is Policy, evaluated separately on every single connection.